INTRODUCTION
settlement to the ethnic conflict.
I argue that the politics of market reform at the time of the first two UNP governments of 1977-93 revolved around two mechanisms -ideological and material. 4 In ideological terms, the market reforming UNP affected an exaggerated performance of Sinhala-Buddhist authenticity to compensate for the latent moral deficit inherent in the reforms. In material terms, they compensated for the withdrawal of the state in some spheres by the expansion of the state in other spheres. In other related research, I
have explored one way in which the civil war played a functional role in providing material and to some extent, ideological support for the reform agenda through the multiplier effects of military fiscalism. By the 1990s, the army had become the single largest employer in the country, offsetting the reduction in civilian state employment under the reforms, and mitigating the growing inequalities of this period. I suggest that this had the largely unintended and unforeseen consequence of facilitating the market reform agenda by helping to win passive quiescence, if not active consent for a policy regime that was broadly opposed by large segments of the population (Venugopal 2008, chapter 5) .
CAUSAL, FUNCTIONAL OR ACCIDENTAL?
Did Sri Lanka"s market reforming elites engineer the civil war in order to mask their economic agenda under a veil of false consciousness? Or did the economic consequences of the reforms, in terms of greater poverty and inequality, spur Tamil grievances or Sinhalese mob violence? These and related arguments are recurrent themes in a small but significant stream of literature that has sought to establish that there is actually a causal relationship between market reforms and civil war.
For example, in a series of thought provoking articles written shortly after the August 1983 riots, the late Newton Gunasinghe used a modified Marxian framework to reforms as well as from the increasingly violent and undemocratic measures used by the government to suppress opposition to the reforms. Moore (1985) describes the differential impact of agricultural trade liberalisation based on the regionalised distribution of tradable versus non-tradable crops. Due to agro-climatic and historical reasons, the island"s export agriculture sector in tea, rubber and coconuts was concentrated largely in the south, while agriculture in the Jaffna peninsula was restricted to minor food crops such as bananas, onions, chillies for domestic consumption. While trade liberalisation benefited the export sector in the south, it resulted in a sharp depression of prices of domestic food crops in the north.
In this way, it could have fed into long-standing Tamil grievances regarding regional development inequalities in the north, relating to the unequal distribution of public sector projects and the acceleration of demographically sensitive irrigation and resettlement schemes.
There are as such a variety of fairly disparate hypotheses all of which seek to connect market reform to conflict. These include (i) the unequal impact of the reforms between rich and poor; (ii) the unequal impact of the reforms upon different elements of the ethnically-segmented business strata; (iii) the unequal regional impact of the reforms upon the north versus south; (iv) the heightened opportunities for ethnically politicised rent-seeking engendered by the massive aid boom that accompanied the reforms; (v) the increase in political violence and state authoritarianism which arose partly in response to suppressing these manifestations of social disorder, both spontaneous and organised, which emerged from the reform process. All these different explanations share a common understanding that in a society where gradations of occupation and class often intersect with regional and ethnic identities, the frustrations that resulted from the abrupt and unequal distribution of costs and benefits from the reforms either resulted or were engineered in the direction of Sinhala-Tamil hostility. Furthermore, it focuses largely on whether the post-hoc economic effects of the reforms might have generated discontent, and much less on the politics of actually implementing the reforms themselves.
THE POLITICS OF MARKET REFORM
The problematique of the politics of market reform in Sri Lanka can for most purposes, be reduced to the simple question of how democratically elected governments set about implementing unpopular economic policies that are certain to damage their electoral prospects. Sri Lanka"s market reform agenda suffers from an inherent lack of popular legitimacy, and is an electoral handicap for any party that wishes to implement it. Yet, the prerogatives of a perpetually insolvent treasury, This system of political morality that regulated state-society relations in post-1956 Sri
Lanka is in essence Sinhala nationalism. Nationalist ideology provided a moral lens through which electoral politics and the actions of the state could be evaluated and imbued with legitimacy (or the lack thereof). This structure of political morality and state legitimacy is also heavily inflected by the distinct social character that Sinhala nationalism gained due to the circumstances in which it came into prominence. In socio-economic terms, the sources of support for Sinhala nationalism have tended to be with the middle classes and lower middle classes, the under-privileged and the poor, rather than the wealthy, such that the rapid spread of nationalist sentiment among wide segments of the population in the 1950s reflected the aspirations of subordinate strata of Sinhalese society, and their cumulative resentment against the domination of the English-speaking, (and largely Sinhalese) ruling elite. As a result, Sinhala nationalism is in effect the ideology of an ethnicised social democratic state in which the state is seen as having deep moral obligations towards society in general, and towards the material and spiritual needs of the Sinhala-Buddhists in particular.
The relationship between the public morality of politics, notions of popular social justice, and Sinhala nationalism framed here is resonant with James Brow"s description of Sinhala nationalism as a "dominant code of moral regulation" that politicians seek to draw upon. "The ideal image of the social order in nationalist rhetoric is one that recognizes the responsibility of government to ensure the welfare of the common people, particularly the peasantry" (Brow 1990, 13) . It also has similarities with Jani De Silva"s (1997) description of how the concept of a "just society" forms a fundamental premise that structures the discursive field of electoral politics, and is captured within the signature slogans advanced by the main electoral parties -such as the UNP"s dharmistha samajaya, (righteous society) the SLFP"s samajavadhi samajaya (socialist society), the LSSP"s sama samajaya (equal society), or the insurgent JVP"s sadharana lova (just world).
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To summarise thus far, the social democratic state as a political, economic and ideological project emerged in close connection, and in a self-reinforcing logic with the advancement of Sinhala nationalism and electoral politics. The illegitimacy of the market reform agenda thus stemmed from the fact it was a project intended primarily 7 They roughly translate into "righteous society", "socialist society", "equal society", and "just world". Thanks to Jagath Senaratne for help with translation.
to dismantle and bypass the social democratic state -and it thus transgressed the moral economy upon which state-society relations had been balanced since at least 1956. For hundreds of thousands of people tenuously straddling the social class continuum from peasant agriculture to the semi-urban lower middle class, the state remained a critical vehicle for economic stability, basic welfare provision and upward social mobility in a market economy characterised by widespread insecurity and deprivation. By increasing the space of the market economy and diminishing that of the state, the reform agenda has clear economic repercussions that retain the latent potential to be viewed, interpreted, evaluated, and rejected on the basis of a system of thought and a moral universe constructed out of the elements of Sinhala nationalism.
It is within this universe of political morality, hinged on the role of the state in promoting social justice and articulated through the vocabulary of nationalism, that one needs to situate the paradox of the politics of market reform, which in essence is a process by which governments must engage in acts that run counter to the public morality. How would the government and the institutions of electoral politics survive such a direct assault upon the system of legitimacy which had sustained it thus far?
There is, and has been in Sri Lanka and in other countries, the perpetual anxiety that the contradictions of this process would become untenable -that either democracy or reforms would give way, leading to free-market dictatorships or dirigiste democracies. Europe: "Under democratic conditions, where the discontent can find political expression at the polls, even the most promising reform strategies may be abandoned (Przeworski 1991, 136-137) .
Without digressing into an expansive review, what emerges clearly from the empirical literature is that where democratic political structures were preserved through periods of aggressive market reform, they did so only in form, but not in content. Case studies systematically describe how successful reformers manipulated and misled electorates, disoriented their opponents, and adroitly exploited loopholes in the political structure to neutralise, divert and insulate themselves from anti-reform pressure. Reforms were also frequently introduced as post-election surprises: reformist leaders were able to exploit sources of legitimacy and popularity entirely unrelated to their economic agenda as such (e.g. as erstwhile pro-democracy activists) to win power and to subsequently unveil a comprehensive package of unpalatable economic policies that were little discussed in their election campaign. Przeworski also notes without any irony that reforms are always introduced by surprise, and uses formal mathematical reasoning to contend that economic shock therapy upon an unsuspecting population is the more difficult but ultimately, the optimal solution: "the success of the bitter-pill strategy depends on its initial brutality" (Przeworski 1991).
Rob Jenkins study on the politics of reform in India is an unorthodox and refreshing break from this genre, if only because it exposes the pious hypocrisy of the mainstream literature on the issue of democracy (Jenkins 1999). He contends that India"s complicated political structure facilitates the implementation of a complex and contentious market reform agenda -but it does so not because of its democratic content as such, but quite the reverse. The existence of mature liberal democratic institutions does not lead to a more inclusive reform process, but rather one that provides pro-reform leaders a variety of strategies and levers by which to subvert, diffuse, corrupt, divide, and divert sources of opposition. As he describes, "Pushing through reform measures requires a broad range of underhanded tactics" and India"s democratic, federalist structure is more amenable to such tactics than a more monolithic state or dictatorship (Jenkins 1999, 206) . He concludes that, "the federal President J.R. Jayewardene later described "the thinking in the country was that the UNP was a spent force which had outlived its purpose" (Jayewardene 1992, ix). This problem of un-electability had much to do with the social and economic character of the UNP, a party historically composed of and for the island"s westernised bourgeois elite, a party of "cosmopolitan capitalists" as it were, largely dominated by merchants, professionals, and planters from low-country Sinhalese origins, but in reality quite broad based in terms of the caste, religious and ethno-linguistic basis of its supporters, financiers, and core constituency (Shastri 2004) . With the UNP as the transparent organisational vehicle of their political interests, they were identifiably a class (indeed, the ruling class) in itself and for itself.
[Insert Figure 4 .1 here]
But in less than a decade after independence, the UNP had lost their grip on power.
Furthermore, the changing structure of electoral politics was in danger of turning them entirely obsolete. The electoral opposition that crystallised against them in the mid1950s was composed of their mirror image on both axes. On the one hand, a powerful opposition emerged from Sinhala nationalists who successfully characterised the UNP as representing a class of deracinated, Christianised, neo-westerners; their removal from power, and the Sinhala-isation of the state being the unfinished business of decolonisation. On the other side were the Marxist left, with their base in the organised working class and trade union movement, who were virulently opposed to the UNP as the party of the pro-western capitalists.
The source of the UNP"s defeat and near-banishment from electoral politics after 1956 was largely to do with the joint ascendancy of these factors, and to the way in which they fashioned the language and moral parameters of electoral politics. As the party of cosmopolitan capitalists, the UNP was on the losing end of the two dominant issues that were animating Sri Lankan electoral politics. Indeed, in terms of electoral arithmetic, the UNP has been defeated on every subsequent occasion when the Marxist left and the Sinhala nationalist right coalesced -which happened in 1956,
1970, and most recently in 2004.
The historical role played by J.R. Jayewardene in Sri Lankan politics is that he effectively resolved the problem of the UNP"s electability, which as he himself described, was a task to "correct the image of the UNP which was considered a conservative, capitalist party" (Jayewardene 1992, ix In the Sri Lankan case, the UNP"s task was complicated by the fact that the available raw materials for electoral populism were virtually by definition anti-UNP, so that the party had in effect to completely transform itself in order to preserve itself. It was a process guided by the kind of rationale which Giuseppe Lampedusa"s fictional character, Tancredi Falconeri put so succinctly in describing the pragmatic compromises and cosmetic reforms endured by the Sicilian aristocracy in order to maintain their privilege and wealth through the Risorgimento: "in order for everything to remain as it is, everything will have to change" (Lampedusa 2008, 50). Lankan history, the UNP were careful to never ever spell out the radical economic reforms that were their core policy agenda. Instead, they sought to appropriate the very language of morality that had been used against them by claiming that they were actually a socialist party, and that they would once in power, usher in the "real socialism" that Mrs Bandaranaike and her left partners had failed to do.
In a process that began grudgingly in the aftermath of the 1956 elections, and more seriously after Jayewardene"s rise to the leadership in 1973, the party that was associated in the public mind with wealthy, urban, westernised businessmen at its helm tried to convince the public that it was now a party of the rural Sinhala-Buddhist poor. Typical of the UNP"s pre-market reform election rhetoric was the speech from the head of a newly opened UNP branch in Trincomalee in 1977: "The UNP was confined to the capitalist class once but it has now been transformed into a party of the common man." 10 The UNP"s 1977 election manifesto similarly stressed that:
The UNP is not only a democratic party: it is also a socialist party … Our policy is to … terminate the exploitation of man by man.
Once in power, the UNP"s strategy in implementing market reforms was effectively two-fold. Firstly, it employed what I term a "compensatory" strategy, offsetting the dismantling of some parts of the social democratic state by preserving and expanding other parts of it. In effect, the UNP bought support for the market reform programme by implementing massive rural development schemes along highly compressed deadlines, expanding the scale, depth and sheer concentration of state patronage down into the village as never before, much of it funded under a massive foreign aid extravaganza. Indeed, all the talk of socialism and of empowering the common man was not as absurd or outrageous a deception as it appeared: for once in power, the UNP did, alongside its quite radical deregulation of the private sector and liberalization of trade, expand the size of the government budget, and the public sector to an extent never seen before.
Consequently, many who study economic reforms in Sri Lanka are struck (in some cases appalled) by the fact that, the size of the state actually increased significantly under reforms. In Sri Lanka, the size of the public sector increased by 20% in the first five years of market reforms, as the budget deficit reached 18% of GDP. Stern (1984) finds that half of the increase in employment during the post-liberalisation period was due to this massive expansion in aid-funded public sector investment projects.
[Insert Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the UNP sought to counter and compensate their perceived deficit of native authenticity by affecting an exaggerated display of Buddhist religiosity. Just as they had successfully appropriated and neutralised the language of socialism and equality during the election campaign, the Jayewardene government also consciously sought to appropriate the vernacular and religious idiom of Sinhala nationalism and to disguise their economic agenda within its structure of signification, in order to pre-emptively neutralise the possibility that this potent language of political legitimacy be turned against them. Sarath Amunugama describes what the UNP did to overcome the legacy of their defeat by Sinhala nationalists in
1956:
The UNP, emulating the SLFP, proclaimed that they would create a "Dharmista" (Righteous) society, a phrase resonant with Buddhist hopes. Mahaweli loans downgraded the project outcome rating from "unsatisfactory" to "highly unsatisfactory", describing how the development effectiveness of the scheme was "extremely limited", and how the incomes of resettled farmers have declined over time, with mean incomes now below the poverty level (World Bank 2004, 19) .
Nevertheless, the AMDP did generate important economic and non-economic returns for the government at the time. In political terms, the unprecedented extent of the project created vast new opportunities for patronage distribution and electoral consolidation at a variety of different levels. In ideological terms, the AMDP had immense cultural significance for the Sinhala-Buddhist imagination as a project to revitalize and repopulate this ancient territory of Sinhalese civilization.
The ambitious young minister in charge of the AMDP project, Gamini Dissanayake, never lost an opportunity to infuse the Mahaweli project with the geographic, historical and religious imagery of nationalism; such that it was never just a development project, but a vast enterprise in the accumulation of symbolic capital for the government. The pioneering ethnographic work of Serena Tennekoon (1988) describes how the government ceremonially inaugurated each of the AMDP"s dams and resettlement colonies with elaborate jala pujas, high profile Buddhist ceremonial rituals and water prayers: events in which the nation"s past and the future were symbolically brought together so to speak. Indeed, even the World Bank"s review of the AMDP in the mid-1980s recognised that while this mammoth development project, which they had financed heavily, was a failure on its own account, its real value was indirect and contingent, and was based on an underlying compensatory logic:
A more important argument was the importance of Mahaweli to the fundamental shift in strategy which the Government was planning. We have already referred to the need seen by the Government, and recognized by the and it was a period of strong economic growth (Dunham and Kelegama 1997) . Dunham and Jayasuriya (2001) characterise the Premadasa period as similar to Indonesia under Suharto, "corrupt and dictatorial, but efficient and good for economic growth" (Dunham and Jayasuriya 2001, 8-9) . 12 At the same time, Premadasa raised the level of public displays of Buddhist religiosity, and the extravagance of state patronage of religion to unprecedented, "frantic" heights (Van der Horst 1995, 131).
As Janaka Biyanwila describes it, "In promoting the interests of capital, the Premadasa regime merged ethno-nationalism with a popular religiosity, while enhancing the religiosity of the state" (Biyanwila 2003, 256) .
The point here is that the strategic politics of market reform in Sri Lanka emerged in the course of the historically path dependent process by which the traditional party of 12 On this topic, see also Stokke (1997) .
that the UNP had sought to appropriate and dominate. The elevated presence of Sinhala nationalism, both in their own rhetoric, and in that of their growing number of opponents, had by the 1983-84 period, effectively trapped the government within a defensive battle to preserve their moral standing, so that they increasingly struggled to time the launching of new initiatives such that they would be least problematic.
The role of the ethnic conflict, and later, the civil war can be situated within this desperate, defensive compulsion of the UNP to seize control of the mantle of Sinhala nationalism, and to starve its opponents of this potent source of political oxygen. A government vigorously pursuing the war, rather than negotiations, became unassailable as the champion of Sinhalese interests, and was able to shield its economic agenda, however unpopular, under the umbrella of patriotism. Opposition to a war-time government, especially economic opposition by trade unions, was easily dismissed at such a time as unpatriotic, and brushed aside with the heavy hand of authoritarianism and emergency regulations.
One important corollary of the prerogative of preserving legitimacy and remaining more Sinhalese than the opposition, is that it has frequently precluded market reforming governments from taking any meaningful steps to resolve the conflict by compromising with Tamil nationalist demands. Having already risked substantial political capital on the reforms, such governments have already placed themselves on the defensive and have been reluctant to further jeopardise their stability by opening themselves up to attack as complicit in the division of the nation. Besides, having positioned themselves as Sinhala nationalists, and having unleashed and encouraged chauvinism among their rank and file, and, as J.R. Jayewardene did, having inducted and promoted rabidly communal Tamil-baiters in their leading ranks, the UNP found that the consequences of their actions, in terms of the alienation and radicalisation of Tamil opinion, was becoming counterproductive to their own material interests; it was becoming impossible to push the Sinhala nationalist genie that they had invoked back into its bottle.
Conscious of the party"s vulnerability to an economically-inspired political backlash articulated through the vocabulary of nationalism, Jayewardene was, throughout 1981-86 period forced to be hesitant and careful in offering concessions on the ethnic conflict to the moderate parliamentary Tamil leadership of the TULF. Any hint of granting concessions to the TULF was sure to energize nationalist opinion, not just in the narrow sense, but it would also ignite the latent anti-reform, anti-capitalist, antielite, sentiment contained within Sinhala nationalism, and would revive the economic opposition, which the government had hitherto successfully dispersed, beaten, and bribed into submission. As a result, Jayewardene exhibited extreme reluctance in taking the relatively modest steps required at that early stage in the conflict to solve the ethnic crisis, even though such a solution would have been in the interests of the UNP and their economic programme. Instead, the festering ethnic conflict became incorporated at a tactical level into the everyday politics of survival for a government that was deeply defensive of its ethnic authenticity, and that had demonstrated political commitment and spent serious political capital only on the issue of economic reform.
When in July 1984, Indira Gandhi urged Jayewardene to consider a more meaningful political response to the TULF (ironically perhaps, considering it was three weeks after Operation Bluestar), he confessed that it would be impossible to sell such a package to the Sinhalese people: "We will lose our entire base. We will lose everybody," he told her grimly (Sabaratnam 2003, chapter 19) . Indeed, the UNP government, and their economic agenda remained internally stable and domestically viable as long as they prosecuted the war in military terms and maintained an unbending obstinacy against concessions to the Tamils. Having slid into civil war partly as a result of their re-orientation towards Sinhala nationalism, the UNP found that any backtracking on this agenda would imperil the stability of their government and all it had achieved.
To this end, Jayewardene"s strategy, as manifest through the tortuous All Parties Conference (APC) exercise that he dragged out from January to December 1984, was in fact not to negotiate with the TULF at all to the extent possible, for this would force him to make actual politically costly concessions. Instead, he effectively schemed to demagoguery.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has revisited the historical experience of the 1977-93 period to advance a generalised proposition on the relationship between economic reform and conflict in contemporary Sri Lanka: that a government intent on pursuing market reforms is in an inherently weak position to implement a political settlement on the ethnic conflict.
In trying to advance these two equally controversial agendas in parallel, the underlying unpopularity and illegitimacy of the reform programme compounded and magnified the growing public suspicion in the south over the government"s commitment to fighting the ethnic conflict and resisting Tamil demands for territorial devolution or separation. This was the case not just for the government of Ranil
Wickremasinghe -which suffered from a weak parliamentary majority, hostile cohabitation with the President, poor public relations, and an inadequate grasp of populist strategy. The fact that such a debacle was repeated in the in the mid-to late 1980s -when the UNP was under the command of an exceptionally shrewd and
Machiavellian political leader with a massive parliamentary majority suggests that there are issues of structural significance beyond personality, style and tactics which need to be given greater consideration.
The proposition on the incompatibility of market reforms with ethnic settlement is of course, subject to limitations and exceptions which should be readily conceded. were accompanied by massive development projects such the AMDP, high-profile poverty alleviation schemes such as Janasaviya, or other ways in which the negative economic consequences of the reforms could (at least in image if not reality) be compensated by other schemes that would mitigate its effects. As a result, market reforms in practice survived because they resulted in an expansion, rather than a reduction in the size of the state; an expansion rather than a reduction in the Sinhalaisation of the state.
